The Great Northern War changed not only the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also the countries of Central Europe. This war brought many tactical and strategic innovations that could be observed on the battlefields and during the war campaigns. That is why it seems appropriate to recall the battles that took place during the Great Northern War. An example of such a battle is a clash between the Swedish-Lithuanian army and Lithuanian-Russian army, which took place near Kryżbork/Jakobstadt on 26 July (5 August) 1704. In this battle the Lithuanian troops fought on both sides. On the Swedish side they were commanded by Kazimierz Jan Sapieha, and on the Russian side -by Michał Serwacy Wiśniowiecki.
insufficient, especially because Lithuanian troops took part in it, and what is more, on both sides4. Therefore, we decided to quote sources, those well-known and less known, which describe the progression of this clash. This was the first battle in which armies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia fought together against their common enemy -Sweden. The author's intention is to present the source material, which may contribute to the creation of a full-fledged scientific text, which may contain an analysis of various materials that were created by all parties to the conflict. Especially because you can find the elaborations of this clash by Swedish and Russian authors5.
In Russian sources information can be found on the number of troops, strength of weapons, route of march6, but there is no account of the confrontation near Kryżbork/ Jakobstadt7. Such reports can be found in German8 and Swedish languages9. The battle is also mentioned by the officers who took part in it, e.g. general Korsak in a letter to Tsar10, and on the Swedish side Robert Peters11, as well as Leonhard Kaggs12, who mentioned the battle in their memoirs.
The Polish sources that will be analysed in this work comprise four versions of the battle and its course. Two accounts come from the memoirs of Krzysztof Zawisza13 and Wawrzyniec Franciszek Rakowski14. The third source is the account of the battle participant, Aleksander Mackiewicz, constituting a part of the work entitled Listy o Szwecji ["Letters about Sweden"] from 184615. The fourth and last source is an unknown account of the battle printed in Polish, which originates most probably from August 170416. The last two reports are particularly interesting, namely those authored by Alexander Mackiewicz and the Relatia o znaczney Batalij..." ["Relation of a significant battle"] from Gdańsk.
The first of the diarists, whose memoirs appeared in 1862, Krzysztof Zawisza, participated in the battle on the side of the Sapieha family (the Sapiehas) and Swedes, commanding (according to him) the left wing. In his diary he placed information about this battle in two places. Firstly, on page 120 he wrote that the clash took place on 5 August, with an addition that reader will find more in Sprawy polskie ["The Polish Affairs"]. The author added that while leading the left wing of the army he managed to stop the opponents and even defeat them completely17. On page 230 we find the second fragment regarding the battle18, with information on the number of troops, where the large disparity of the forces is underlined (7000 on the Swedish and Sapieha's side versus 18 000 on the Lithuanian-Russian side). The diarist added that the opponent suffered very large losses compared to his side, and he mentions several Lithuanian officers. Looking at this fragment of the diary, we do not find information about the course of the battle (except that Zawisza stood on the left wing and defeated the enemy). Only the place of the clash, the date and number of soldiers participating, as well as the casualties (300 on the Swedish-Lithuanian side and 5000 on the Lithuanian-Russian side). Zawisza's short information contains some interesting facts that need to be verified.
The second diary about the aforementioned battle, written by Wawrzyniec F. Rakowski, presents us Michał Serwacy Wiśniowiecki's account of the conflict19, different from Zawisza's. We are informed that Wiśniowiecki besieged Zelborg unsuccessfully. When the Swedish-Sapieha's army approached from Riga, he withdrew to Kryżbork/Jakobstadt, where in the evening the battle took place. In this case, the author gives different facts (than Zawisza), namely he informs that there were 3000 Russian troops (Zawisza mentioned 6000). Wiśniowiecki was placed on the left wing, and according to Rakowski, he managed well. On the other hand, Russians on the right wing were destroyed, and the entire Lithuanian formation escaped after them. With regard to the losses, Rakowski claims that 2000 Russians and 500 Lithuanians died, as well as 3000 Swedes on the other side (these are different numbers than those mentioned by Zawisza). As for important information, Rakowski reported that the Lithuanian-Russian side had abandoned 25 cannons, which were taken by the opponent, and that the Lithuanian infantry had been taken captive by the Swedish army. This short fragment of the diary brings us further information to verify (including the number of troops and losses). Rakowski confirms the reports of Zawisza concerning the place of the battle (Kryżbork) and the date (5 August) . He gives us laconic information about the location of Lithuanian-Russian troops and the course of the battle. The last sentence is also interesting, in which Rakowski refers to plundering of wagons of the whole army. This information is important because in the it also appears in the Swedish account (mentioned below).
While the memoirs of Zawisza and Rakowski are well-known among the historians studying the Great Northern War, the memories of Aleksander Mackiewicz20 are less so. It is hard to suppose that one could find a report from the battle of Kryżbork/Jakobstadt in the scientific papers of Eustachy Tyszkiewicz (living in 1814-1873). However, such an account is there. Listy o Szwecji ["Letters about Sweden"] by Tyszkiewicz have the character of a historical research work, in which the author conducts his narrative about the events of the Great Northern War, weaving them with quotes and simultaneously naming their sources. This is important because it gives us valuable material in terms of merit, with a lot of names of the people involved in this battle on the Lithuanian-Russian side. An interesting fact is that Ignacy Chodźko (writer of historical novels, living in the years 1794-1861) based his creations on this work and account. In the article Pisma Ignacego Chodźki ["Ignacy Chodźko Scripture's"], published twenty years after the death of the novelist (1881), we find the description of the battle of Kryżbork/Jakobstadt21, from which Radosław Sikora drawn his account22. Chodźko himself cleverly weaves the story of the battle into a historical novel with dialogues, set in the 1830s. He cites the story happening in Olyka in Volhynia (Radziwiłł's estates), where every year a coffin with the remains of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł and his two wives was exhibited during the Holy Mass in the Collegiate of the Holy Trinity founded by him23. In the story of Chodźko the Field Hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł (Rybeńko), arrives on such a ceremony (on July 3), during which he asks a man named Nagórski, participant of the aforementioned battle, to tell his account of it. Chodźko published in the footnote the information that the account derives from the "modern manuscript", but without giving additional information about where it is and what else is contained there. Chodźko puts Mackiewicz's account in Nagórski's mouth, but what is quite important is that he omitted several fragments, among others were those where Mackiewicz discloses the names of the officers who were the first to escape from the battlefield. Furthermore, Chodźko adds some information that is not in Mackiewicz's account. Therefore, the contents of Ignacy Chodźko's Podania litewskie ["Lithuanian stories"] should be treated with caution.
According to Mackiewicz's account, the battle took place on 5 August (Tuesday) before the sunset, and Wiśniowiecki was located "in front of the sun". The right wing of the Wiśniowiecki's army was strong and well-formed (there were 5000 troops including the dragoons, the reiters, the petyhorcy (lithuanian cavalry units) units, the pancerni ["heavyarmored"] units and the hussars). On the weaker left wing 20 cavalry units were located. The Swedes attacked the left wing, so Wiśniowiecki sent two hussar units, one petyhorcy unit and two heavy-armored units. After passing their own infantry, they encountered Swedish reiters, which began to shoot at this formation, which caused immediate escape of the Wiśniowiecki's hussars, who were followed by the remaining units. Only the hussar unit of the Great Chancellor of Lithuania, Karol Stanisław Radziwiłł, survived. After three salvoes they charged at the Swedes, who withdrew under the pressure of attack carried out by this unit with supporting them petyhorcy units, which hit the sides of the Swedish formation. The pursuit of hussars and 23 heavy-armed units lasted for "half a mile", up to the Swedish reserves. Then the Swedes hit the right wing, breaking down the reiter and dragoons formations standing there. Some facts are noteworthy, namely the number of troops (5000 Lithuanian, 3900 Russian). In the case of the Russian army, the names Niczaj, Protopov, Suchatyn and Korsak are mentioned, which we do not witness in Polish memoirs. However, looking at the Russian sources, it turns out that the officers took part in this battle. Niczaj was the commander of the regiment of riflemen (Иван Константинович Нечаев), as well as Protopov (Михаил Иванович Протопопов), Suchatyn commanded the dragoon regiment (Григори Андреевич Сухотин), and Korsak was the commander of the corps (Богдан Семёнович Корсак) � . This may indicate the authenticity of Mackiewicz's account, because no other Polish account mentions these names. Another important information given by Mackiewicz is the formation of Wiśniowiecki troops and the course of this clash. Rakowski wrote that the Russians were defeated and fled, while in this account there is no information about what happened to the Russian troops. What is also interesting is the mention about the escape of Polish units, including the hussar ones, after the first Swedish salvo.
The last of the accounts described in this work is unknown to Polish historiography � , or just as the previous one does not function in the scientific circuit. This is a Swedish account of the victory at Kryżbork/Jakobstadt. This report was found by the author during the query in the State Archives in Gdańsk24. It is a "leaflet" type of print, praising the victory of the Swedish and Sapieha's troops. According to this report, Lewenhaupt, after joining Sapieha, went with the army (which comprised 3000 Swedes and 2000 Sapieha's men) at Zelborg. He announced, however, that he intends to capture Birże. As we read in the accounts of Wiśniowiecki and Ogiński, they gathered all their assets there. In this situation, they ordered them to be transported to the army near Zelborg. The convoy of these "treasures" was attacked by the Sapieha's cavalry under the command of the Pantler of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Kazimierz Zaranka Horbowski, who seized 300 wagon of goods together with horses (only coin money was worth 30 000 thalers), and a supply of gunpowder and ammunition. Similar information can be found in Rakowski's account. Lewenhaupt and Sapieha arrived near Zelborg on Tuesday morning, 26 July (5 August), but they did not find Wiśniowiecki there, because he had already left to the east. The Swedes followed the Lithuanian army and caught up with them on the same day, "two miles from Zelborg". The Sapieha's people immediately attacked the army of Wiśniowiecki, however, they encountered 24 cannons (Rakowski states that there were 25 of them) filled with shrapnel ("grape-shot") and Russian infantry, which forced them to escape. This account gives us a certain view of the position of the Swedish army: the left wing was commanded by Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt, the center was commanded by colonel Anders Wennerstedt, and the right wing by colonel Berndt Otto Stackelberg25. Such Swedish formations were met by escaping Sapieha's units. Lewenhaupt managed to calm them down and turn back and together with the Swedes they attacked the enemy. This attack caused the Lithuanians led by Wiśniowiecki and Ogiński to leave the battlefield, while (according to this report) only Russians remained there. They shot three salvoes, and then, under the pressure of the Swedish fire, they fled after the Swedish charge. The chase was led by Sapieha's men. If it were not for the night, the losses of Lithuanian-Russian troops, according to this report, would have been much larger. The author of this account states that the opponent had 18 000 people (up to 5000 of Swedes and Sapieha's). The losses of Lithuanian-Russian armies are estimated at 3029 killed on the battlefield and another 2000 during the pursuit. The Swedes captured cannons, wagons, ammunition, tents, weapons, horses. More than three hundred soldiers were taken captive and a few hundred were wounded. Swedish-Lithuanian losses are not reported. According to this account, the battle lasted from noon until late at night, probably the author counts the capturing of Wiśniowiecki's wagon supplies on the way from Birże to Zelborg. At the end of the account there is an information given that after the battle, the people of Wiśniowiecki and Ogiński capitulated, expressing their willingness to serve the Sapiehas.
While considering all four accounts, we will put together the information they provide, including the number of troops and casualties in this battle, the issue of armies' location and formation, and who attacked first, who won the given part, and who first left the battlefield.
In all four accounts, we see the small differences in the number of Swedish-Sapiehas' troops (from 5000 to 7000). In the case of the number of Lithuanian-Russian troops, Zawisza and the Gdańsk report give us 18 000, Mackiewicz gives about 9000, and Rakowski does not give the full number of troops. The numbers of the casualties also differ, because according to Zawisza only 300 were killed on the Swedish-Sapiehas' side, while Rakowski states that 3000 were killed, and the other accounts do not report losses. And in the case of those killed by the Lithuanian-Russian side, Zawisza and the Gdańsk report say about 5000, and Rakowski mentions 2500. Due to the fact that Polish researchers were not interested in this battle, we do not have reliable data. The Russian general Korsakov in a letter to tsar Peter I, written after the battle, did not give any numbers about the troops taking part in this clash26. Most figures (exaggerated ones) are given by Robert Peters, who wrote in his diary that the Russians counted 12 000 regular infantry and 15 000-16 000 Cossacks, while the Lithuanians side had 11 800 soldiers, which would total to 38 800 people on the Lithuanian-Russian side27. According to him, the Swedes were supposed to have 9830 soldiers28. Another of the Swedish officers states in his diary that the Swedes had 3080 soldiers together with 2000 Sapiehas' people, while the Lithuanian-Russian army comprised of 15 000 soldiers29. Due to these differences, we have to resort to Swedish and Russian calculations. H.E. Uddgren reports that the Lewenhaupt army numbered 3080 people, including 1597 infantry and 1406 cavalry and dragoons, plus 77 gunners at 16 guns. Sapieha had about 2000-3000 people, including 100 infantry and two guns. There were reportedly 3500 Russian soldiers, and Wiśniowiecki and Ogiński had about 10 000-12 000 soldiers30. В. С. Великанов writes that the Swedes had 3080 people and 16 guns, and Sapieha had about 6000 soldiers and 2 cannons. In contrast, Lithuanian-Russian troops total 12 000-15 000 people, including 2500 infantry and 21 cannons31.
The conclusion is as follows: most of the accounts gave similar data on the size of the Swedish-Sapiehas' troops, while there weren't 18 000 Lithuanian-Russian troops, but much less. As for the losses, Uddgren reports that the Swedes had 57 dead and 181 wounded. Великанов writes that the Swedes lost 57 dead and 181 wounded (he based it on Uddgren's data), Sapieha has 187 killed, the Russians 600 dead, and the Lithuanians "lost more people than the Russians". According to these calculations, losses on one side and on the other side are not as large as reported by aforementioned accounts.
With regard to the location of the army on the battlefield, the situation was as follows. Zawisza only states that he stood alone on the left wing of the Polish units. Rakowski states that Wiśniowiecki stood on the left wing and the Russians on the right, and the guns were in the centre, not giving the Swedish-Sapieha's location. Mackiewicz, however, informs that Wiśniowiecki stood on the right wing with the cavalry, the infantry stood in the centre, and on the left wing also the cavalry. He doesn't mention where the Russians stood. Report from Gdańsk informs that Lewenhaupt stood on the Swedish left wing, Wennerstedt stood in the centre, and Stackelberg on the right, while Sapieha's troops were in front of the Swedish army. As for the opponent, he states that the Russians together with cannons were in the centre. Uddgren reports that Stackelberg was standing on the right wing and Wennerstedt on the left wing. What is important, Uddgren writes that Zawisza stood with the cavalry on the left wing, which would confirm the memoirs of the diarist himself. He also states that Sapieha's army was chasing the defeated units for 20 kilometers32. Великанов, however, states that the position of the Lithuanian-Russian troops was as follows: starting from the right wing, Wiśniowiecki with the cavalry, then Lithuanian infantry, Protopov's and Niczaj's Russian infantry, and then Korsak and Ogiński with the cavalry on the edge of the left wing. The Swedes were set up as follows: on the right side stood Stachelberg with the Ibidem, pp. 25-26. 31 Leonhard Kaggs, Dagbok 1698 -1722 , utgåva Adam Lewenhaupt, Stockholm 1912 cavalry, alongside him the Bruchner's infantry, the cavalry in the centre, then Wennerstedt's infantry and cavalry, and Sapieha's cavalry in the second line33.
Regarding the movements of the troops on the battlefield, Zawisza reports that he resisted the opponent's attack and then went into counter-attack. Rakowski states only that the Russians were the first to escape from the battlefield, and after them followed all the formations and other Lithuanian troops. Mackiewicz, in turn, reports that Wiśniowiecki himself, leading five units of cavalry, moved from right to left wing, where, not without problems, he managed to break through the opponent's formation and even get to the back side of the Swedish army, while the Swedish left wing chased the Lithuanian right away from the battlefield. The report from Gdańsk states that the Sapieha's advance guard was stopped by the infantry's and cannons' fire and started to escape, but turned back and together with the Swedes attacked Wiśniowiecki's entire formation, breaking through it, and after that the Sapieha's people pursued the defeated.
Looking at these descriptions and statements, it is evident on whose side a given account was created, and that the number of versions of a given event is equal to the number of its accounts. As always in such cases, the question arises about their authenticity. However, it can already be said that these accounts constitute a valuable, in terms of merit, source for describing the course of the battle of Kryżbork/Jakobstadt. They complement research and materials used by Swedish and Russian researchers. The aim we set ourselves, that is to pay attention to this "specific" source base, has been achieved. And the next step will be to describe the campaign and the course of this battle and present it to a wider audience.
It is worth remembering and recalling battles, even those less significant. Although they do not bring much to the research in terms of martial arts, their political significance is equally important. And in this case, we are dealing with such a battle, because the Lithuanians were fighting on both sides, which means that the fight was of a "fratricidal" character (civil war). What is more, for the first time the Polish army stood side by side with the Russian army, which from that moment (and from signing the agreements in Narva a few days after that battle) was more involved in the fight against the Swedish king Charles XII on the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
